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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3228 
_____________ 
  
ELWOOD SMALL; 
 PEARLIE DUBOSE, JR., 
                          Appellants 
  
v. 
  
JOHN WETZEL, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department  
of Corrections in his Official Capacity; DAVID PITKINS, Superintendent of the State 
 Correctional Institution at Laurel Highlands, in his Official and Personal Capacities; 
 TIM PLEACHER, Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services at SCI-Laurel 
Highlands, 
 in his Official and Personal Capacities; WILLIAM MAILMAN, Classification and 
Program Manager 
 for SCI-Laurel Highlands in his Official and Personal Capacities; LIEUTENANT 
CONTI;  
HARRY MAUST; JOHN DOES 1-4  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 3-12-cv-00083) 
District Judge:  Hon. Kim R. Gibson 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2013 
 
Before:  SMITH, FISHER, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 
 
(Filed: June 11, 2013) 
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OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Elwood ―Atheem‖ Small and Pearlie DuBose, Jr. appeal the order of the District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granting the motion to dismiss their 
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (―RLUIPA‖), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq.  Small and DuBose allege that 
their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution were violated when they were strip-searched in the presence of women and 
when their participation in religious holiday events was, according to prison policy, 
conditioned upon their signing a document that allegedly placed restrictions on their 
religious practice.  They also allege a violation of their rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause because inmates practicing another religion were not subject to restrictions on 
their practice.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court‘s order in 
large part and vacate and remand as to the dismissal of the equal protection claim. 
I. 
 Small and DuBose are practicing Muslims who, at the time when the events 
underlying this matter took place, were incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution 
at Laurel Highlands (―SCI-Laurel Highlands‖).  Both Small and DuBose were housed in 
D-Unit, a medical unit at SCI-Laurel Highlands that houses inmates with medical 
conditions as well as some inmates with general-population status who assist with the 
care of patients in the unit.  D-Unit keeps a staff of nurses onsite full-time.  Small and 
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DuBose‘s complaint focuses on two circumstances at the prison involving their 
observance of Islam, which, they allege, violated their constitutional rights.   
The first occurred on October 5, 2009, when the prison was placed under general 
lockdown and all inmates in D-Unit were strip-searched.  Defendant Lieutenant Conti 
was the superior officer on that day, and Harry Maust, a maintenance worker, allegedly 
ordered Small, DuBose, and other inmates to remove their clothes, spread their buttocks, 
and lift their penises to facilitate the search.  Maust was allegedly accompanied by 
corrections officers as well as female civilian staff.  Small and DuBose each asked to 
have the strip search performed in the nearby shower area or behind a curtain instead of 
their open cubicles, because Islam prohibits men from being naked in front of women 
other than their spouses.  Small and Dubose claim that Maust and the corrections officers 
threatened them with reassignment to the Restrictive Housing Unit and handcuffing if 
they did not comply with the search.  They further note that the search violated the strip-
search policy of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, which provides that ―[a] 
strip search should be conducted in an area separate from other inmates and to assure 
privacy and minimum embarrassment.  Absent exigent circumstances, same gender 
correctional personnel shall search inmates.‖  App. 71a. 
 The second circumstance at SCI-Laurel Highlands giving rise to the complaint at 
issue concerns the prison‘s policy for observance of Ramadan, a holy month in Islam.  
The claims related to the Ramadan policy are Small‘s, and do not include DuBose.  As 
alleged in the complaint, meals and hydration are only permitted during nighttime hours 
during Ramadan.  Moreover, the complaint alleges, observance of Ramadan requires 
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participation in nightly prayers and a feast at the end of the month called the Eid-al-Fitr.  
SCI-Laurel Highlands provides for the observance of Ramadan by designating a time for 
community prayer each evening, providing observing inmates with a bag of food known 
as a Sahur bag to be consumed at night, and by allowing participation in the Eid-al-Fitr 
feast for a fee of ten dollars. 
 Participation in the prison‘s Ramadan program requires inmates to sign a 
document called ―Guidelines for Participation in Ramadan at SCI-Laurel Highlands‖ (the 
―Guidelines‖).  App. 69a.  The Guidelines require an inmate to indicate whether he will 
attend nightly fast-breaking and prayer with a group of inmates, or break fast and pray in 
his cell.  The Guidelines indicate in boldface that ―[n]o changes will be made after the 
start of Ramadan.‖  Id.  The Guidelines also stipulate that ―[p]articipants who are 
medically cleared must fast from food and drink from sunrise to sunset for the month of 
Ramadan.‖  Id.  By signing the Guidelines, an inmate acknowledges that ―any violation 
of these guidelines (as outlined above) may result in the institution no longer 
accommodating my participation in Ramadan and/or the Eid feasts.‖  Id. 
 Small argues before this Court, as he alleged in the complaint, that ―Islam permits 
a Muslim who breaks fast to make up such fast time on other days in the following year 
prior to the next observance of Ramadan.‖  Small Brief (―Small Br.‖) 10.  In fact, Small 
claimed that Islam requires its followers to continue to participate in evening prayers and 
the Eid-al-Fitr prayers and feast, as they are ―not excused from such duties merely for 
breaking fast.‖  App. 52a.  However, the Ramadan policy (―Ramadan Policy‖) of SCI-
Laurel Highlands articulated in the Guidelines does not acknowledge the possibility that 
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an inmate might observe Ramadan even while breaking fast on occasion.  As a result, 
Small refused to sign the Guidelines, and alleged that he was ―denied full rights to 
participate in group prayers in observance of Ramadan.‖  Id. 
 John Wetzel, David Pitkins, Tim Pleacher, William Mailman, Lieutenant Conti, 
and Harry Maust (collectively, the ―defendants‖) filed a motion to dismiss Small and 
DuBose‘s complaint, which the Magistrate Judge recommended be granted.  The 
Magistrate Judge‘s Report and Recommendation also indicated that the defendants are 
protected from suit by qualified immunity.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the 
Magistrate Judge allowed the parties to file written objections to the Report and 
Recommendation, which Small and DuBose did.  The Magistrate Judge then issued a 
Supplement to the Report and Recommendation, and the District Court adopted the 
Report and Recommendation, and dismissed all of Small‘s and DuBose‘s claims for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 
this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court‘s grant of the defendants‘ motion to dismiss.  Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  In so doing, ―[w]e take as true all the 
factual allegations of the [complaint] and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from them, . . . but we disregard legal conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause 
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.‖  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 
F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  ―[W]hen the plaintiff pleads 
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged,‖ the claim has ―facial plausibility‖ and the complaint 
will survive defendant‘s motion to dismiss.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).  
Furthermore, ―[w]e review the district court‘s grant of qualified immunity de novo as it 
raises a purely legal issue.‖  Burns v. PA Dep‘t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
III. 
 Small and DuBose argue that the October 5, 2009 strip search in the presence of 
female prison staff violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable 
search and seizure.  They brought these claims before the District Court pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (and, we presume, the Fourteenth Amendment).
1
  The Supreme Court has 
recently underscored that ―correctional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable 
search policies to detect and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities. . . .  The 
task of determining whether a policy is reasonably related to legitimate security interests 
is peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials,‖ so 
that, ―in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials 
have exaggerated their response to these considerations[,] courts should ordinarily defer 
to their expert judgment in such matters.‖  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of 
Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012) (quotation marks omitted).  Florence 
applies the balancing test laid out by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 
                                              
1
 Although Small and DuBose also alleged in their complaint that the strip search violated 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, they do not seek this 
Court‘s review of the District Court‘s dismissal of that claim. 
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(1979), to the strip-search context.  In Bell, the Court held that ascertaining the 
reasonableness of prison-security measures under the Fourth Amendment requires courts 
to consider ―the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.‖  Id. at 559. 
Applying this balancing test, the Supreme Court in Florence held that it is 
constitutional to conduct a full strip search of an individual detained in the general 
population of a jail, regardless of the reason for detention or the existence of reasonable 
suspicion that the individual is concealing something.  Contrary to Small and DuBose‘s 
position, the distinguishing fact that Florence concerned the strip search of an individual 
held in jail while his case was being processed, rather than the strip search of an 
individual serving his sentence for a crime of which he was convicted (as in Small and 
DuBose‘s case), does not weigh in their favor.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 (explaining that 
the need for ―a mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the 
provisions of the Constitution that are of general application . . . . applies equally to 
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners.‖ (quotation marks omitted)). 
For Small and DuBose‘s purposes, a more important distinguishing fact is that, in 
Florence, the holding that inmates may be strip searched on entering a prison population 
was based on the principle that ―correctional officials must be permitted to devise 
reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession of contraband in their 
facilities.‖  Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1516.  But although that rationale is absent from the 
instant case, here we confront a strip search conducted during a prison lockdown — an 
emergency situation where it is not unreasonable to conduct a strip search in groups.  
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Small and DuBose did not plead in their complaint that the lockdown involved anything 
but the urgency and tension generally ascribed to a lockdown.  The fact that female staff 
members from SCI-Laurel Highlands were present does not outweigh the need for safety 
and expediency in an emergency circumstance.  The policy of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections appears to reflect that the widely-favored same-gender strip 
searches would be conducted in non-emergency circumstances.  See App. 71a (―Absent 
exigent circumstances, same gender correctional personnel shall search inmates.‖).  For 
these reasons, we do not hold that the mere presence of women during the lockdown strip 
search on October 5, 2009 rendered the searches unconstitutional. 
IV. 
 Small also argues that the requirements of the Ramadan policy at SCI-Laurel 
Highlands violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment.  RLUIPA 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution, . . . even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability, unless the government demonstrates 
that imposition of the burden on that person[] (1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).  This Court has held that  
[f]or the purposes of RLUIPA, a substantial burden exists 
where: 1) a follower is forced to choose between following 
the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise 
generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of 
the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 
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2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to 
substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.   
 
Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).  Small contends that the prison‘s 
Ramadan Guidelines place a substantial burden on his religious observance because they 
prohibit a Muslim who breaks fast on one day from fulfilling his or her duty to continue 
with nightly prayer and participate in an Eid-al-Fitr feast nonetheless.  Because RLUIPA 
does not allow for the recovery of money damages, Small seeks only injunctive and 
declaratory relief prohibiting enforcement of the Ramadan Policy.  See Sharp v. Johnson, 
669 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2012) (―RLUIPA does not permit an action against 
Defendants in their individual capacities; [t]hus, RLUIPA cannot impose direct liability 
on Defendants.‖). 
 The defendants rejoin, and the District Court held, that Small‘s claim is moot, 
because Small was transferred from SCI-Laurel Highlands to a different institution within 
the Pennsylvania correctional system.  Small contends that the Guidelines governing 
Ramadan participation at SCI-Laurel Highlands appear to be Guidelines established 
throughout the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, not just at SCI-Laurel 
Highlands.  However, the record does not bear this out.  See App. 67a (Ramadan 
Procedure labeled ―Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections[,] State 
Correctional Institution at Laurel Highlands‖); see also App. 69a (―Guidelines for 
Participation in Ramadan at SCI-Laurel Highlands‖).  Although it is possible that the 
correctional institution where Small is currently incarcerated might have a Ramadan 
policy with the same requirements as those in place at SCI-Laurel Highlands, Small did 
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not allege this in his complaint.  We hold, therefore, that the actual-controversy 
requirement of Article III is not met in this case because Small lacks standing to bring 
suit for prospective relief under RLUIPA.  See McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 
213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012) (indicating that Article III standing requires, among other things, 
that the plaintiff establish a concrete, particularized injury-in-fact that is ―actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,‖ and explaining that when ―prospective relief 
is sought, the plaintiff must show that he is likely to suffer future injury from the 
defendant‘s conduct‖ (quotation marks omitted)).  Accordingly, the District Court 
properly dismissed Small‘s RLUIPA claim concerning the Ramadan Policy.   
 The same is true of Small‘s request for injunctive and declaratory relief as to his 
claims that the Ramadan Policy violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment, and his equal protection claim, alleging discriminatory treatment of 
Muslim inmates observing Ramadan as compared with Jewish inmates practicing 
Judaism in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and RLUIPA.  Because 
these allegations all concern the Ramadan Policy in place at SCI-Laurel Highlands, 
where Small is no longer an inmate, we hold that Small does not have standing to seek 
injunctive relief. 
 As to Small‘s claim for monetary relief because of the Ramadan Policy, we will 
affirm the District Court‘s dismissal because we hold that the Guidelines do not violate 
his First Amendment right to exercise his religion freely.  The Supreme Court held in 
Turner v. Safley that ―a prison regulation [that] impinges on inmates‘ constitutional 
rights . . . is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.‖  482 U.S. 
11 
 
78, 89 (1987).  The following factors are relevant to determining whether such a 
reasonable relation exists:   
(1) [T]here must be a valid, rational connection between the 
prison regulation and the legitimate, neutral governmental 
interest put forward to justify it (the ‗First Turner Factor‘); (2) 
whether the inmate has alternative means of exercising the 
right at issue; (3) the burden that the accommodation would 
impose on prison resources; and (4) whether any ready 
alternatives to the regulation exist that would fully 
accommodate the inmate‘s rights at de minimis cost to valid 
penological objectives. 
 
Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).  We have 
held that satisfaction of the first Turner factor is a threshold inquiry before the other 
factors can be considered, and we have placed the burden of proving the first Turner 
factor on prison officials.  Id.  Here, the defendants argue that the Ramadan Policy 
protects against serving extra meals to inmates who claim to be observant Muslims but in 
fact break daytime fast and eat the nighttime Ramadan meal.  Defendants‘ Brief (―Defs.‘ 
Br.‖) 23.  Moreover, they explain that the policy prevents inmates who are not observant 
Muslims from ―moving out of their cells during the predawn hours of darkness.‖  Id.  We 
hold that the defendants have met their ―slight‖ burden, Sharp, 669 F.3d at 156, of 
showing that a valid, rational connection exists between the Ramadan Policy and its 
justifying governmental interests — namely, ―ensur[ing] cost effectiveness, preservation 
of resources, and the general good order of the prison, as well as the maintenance of 
institutional authority,‖ Defs.‘ Br. 25.   
 Balancing the remaining Turner factors, we likewise hold that the Ramadan Policy 
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.  In Turner, the Supreme Court 
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emphasized that, where ―other avenues remain available for the exercise of the asserted 
right, . . . courts should be particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference 
owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.‖  Turner, 482 
U.S. at 90.  In the instant case, the Ramadan Policy permitted Small to observe Ramadan 
in accordance with the requirements of Islam, but did not allow Small to observe the 
particular provision of Islam that allows an observing Muslim to break fast on occasion 
during Ramadan and make it up later in the year.  Thus there was an ―alternative means‖ 
of observing Ramadan available to Small, which means that, as to the second Turner 
factor, we must defer to the corrections officers in evaluating the constitutionality of the 
Ramadan policy.  Furthermore, an accommodation that would require the prison to 
determine which Muslim inmates had broken fast on a given day, and accordingly 
withhold a nighttime meal from an observant Muslim, would appear to place a noticeable 
burden on prison officials.  Therefore, the third Turner factor also weighs in favor of a 
holding that the restriction on Small‘s religious practice is reasonably supported by a 
legitimate penological objective.  Finally, the Turner Court made clear that the fourth 
factor (whether ready alternatives exist) ―is not a ‗least restrictive alternative‘ test.‖  Id. at 
90.  We do not doubt that Small‘s suggestion of providing nighttime meals only when an 
inmate has not broken fast would allow inmates to observe Ramadan in accordance with 
more of the holy month‘s provisions as Small represents them.  However, given the 
deference owed to prison officials in determining how best to use their resources to keep 
an orderly and safe facility, we hold that the Ramadan Policy does not violate Small‘s 
First Amendment rights. 
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Small claims, finally, monetary damages arising out of violation of his right to 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Small alleges that ―Defendants‘ 
actions have singled out the Muslim religion as against other religions for discriminatory 
treatment,‖ as ―Jews who participate in holy days of fasting and feasting are not required 
to sign a comparable restriction to the Ramadan Participation Sheet.‖  App. 59a.  
Although the Magistrate Judge found, and the District Court adopted the view, that 
―Small offers no allegations of fact — not one — just a bald and noxious conclusion that 
‗Jews‘ get better treatment,‖ App. 31a, it appears clear to us that the complaint outlines 
the Ramadan Policy in great detail, alleges that Jewish inmates also have holy days of 
fasting and feasting, and charges that Jewish inmates are not required to sign forms like 
the Guidelines in order to participate in those holy days.  We hold that this is sufficient to 
make out an equal protection claim in this context, as the prison‘s policy regarding 
Jewish holy days is precisely the kind of information that a non-Jewish inmate would 
seek to obtain during the discovery phase of litigation.  Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (―This 
plausibility determination will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court 
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.‖ (quotation marks omitted)). 
Small seeks compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages against the defendants 
for the alleged violation of his rights under the Equal Protection clause.  Because the 
complaint pleads no injury compensable by monetary damages, we will affirm the 
dismissal of Small‘s claim for compensatory damages.  Furthermore, we hold that Small 
has not stated a plausible claim for relief in the form of punitive damages.  This Court has 
explained that an award of punitive damages requires a showing of ―reckless or callous 
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disregard of, or indifference to, the rights and safety of others,‖ and must be ―reserved for 
special circumstances.‖  Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 469-70 (3d Cir.1992).  
Small has not alleged that the defendants exhibited the recklessness or callousness 
necessary to allow a claim for punitive damages to proceed.  Accordingly, we will vacate 
the District Court‘s order only as to Small‘s claim for nominal damages for the alleged 
violation of his equal protection rights. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.   
